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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon this Court by-
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's Motion 
for Continuance and grant defendant's Motion in Limine an abuse of 
discretion. A trial court has substantial discretion in deciding 
whether to grant continuances. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). The trial judge's action in denying a 
continuance will not be reversed on appeal unless the court has 
abused that discretion by acting unreasonably. 
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 926 (Utah App. 1989). The trial 
court also has broad discretion to permit or deny the testimony of 
witnesses. Christenson v. Jewkes, supra; Adroit v. Electric Mutual 
Liability Ins. Co., 542 P.2d 810, 815 (Ariz. 1975); In Re Estate of 
Gardner, 505 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. App. 1972). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a dental malpractice action arising from treatment 
provided by defendant Dr. Carl Dickerson ("Dr. Dickerson") to 
plaintiff from February 1986 through April 1988. (R. at 1-8). 
This matter was originally set for trial on April 10, 1991. 
(R. at 62). Two days before trial, plaintiff's counsel requested 
a continuance of the trial based on their representation that the 
treating dentist on whom they were relying to testify as an expert 
witness at trial declined to testify. Based on plaintiff's 
representations, and in spite of the added expense and 
inconvenience to defendant, the trial court granted plaintiff's 
first Motion for continuance on April 9, 1991, one day before 
trial. (R. at 164-166). 
This matter was reset for trial to begin on August 26, 1991, 
and the parties were ordered by the trial court to exchange new 
expert witness lists, identifying their expert witnesses by April 
19, 1991. (R. at 164-166). There was no provision in the trial 
court's Order for additional time to identify new fact witnesses. 
The trial court also ordered that all discovery be completed twenty 
(20) days before trial. (R. at 165). 
On August 19, 1991 plaintiff mailed her new witness list to 
defendant, naming a new expert witness and six new fact witnesses. 
(R. at 171-173) (Plaintiff incorrectly states in her brief, at page 
9, that she telefaxed this information to defendant). Upon receipt 
of plaintiff's untimely Witness List on or about August 22, 1991, 
defendant filed an objection to plaintiff's designation of new 
witnesses and a Motion in Limine to preclude plaintiff from calling 
her newly named expert witness and the six newly identified fact 
witnesses at trial. (R. at 174-183). Defendant's Objection to 
Plaintiff's Witness List and Motion in Limine were heard by the 
trial court on Friday, August 23, 1991 by telephone conference 
hearing and again on August 26, 1991 at the commencement of trial. 
(R. at 184, 199-219). At that time, plaintiff verbally moved the 
trial court for a second continuance of the trial date. 
After hearing argument from the parties and reviewing the 
memoranda submitted, the trial court denied plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance and granted defendant's Motion in Limine. (R. at 199-
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202). The trial court found that plaintiff's untimely designation 
of witnesses, both fact and expert, was in violation of the court's 
Order. The trial court further found that defendant would be seri-
ously prejudiced if the untimely identified witnesses were allowed 
to testify. Based on the lack of expert testimony, plaintiff's 
case was dismissed. (R. at 199-202). 
On or about November 12, 1991, plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Relief from Order. (R. at 226-250). Plaintiff's Motion for Relief 
from Order was denied by the trial court on December 12, 1991. (R. 
at 280-282, 284-286). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is an action alleging dental malpractice. The 
action was commenced on March 8, 1990 and arises from dental care 
provided to plaintiff by Dr. Dickerson from February 1986 through 
April 1988. (R. at 1-8). 
2. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Dr. Dickerson 
improperly filled cavities, failed to properly treat problems in 
plaintiff's teeth and failed to refer plaintiff to a specialist. 
(R. at 5). 
3. Pursuant to the pre-trial settlement conference held on 
January 8, 1991, and based on the fact that settlement of the case 
was unsuccessful, this matter was originally set for trial, 
commencing Wednesday, April 10, 1991. (R. at 62-66). 
4. Two days before trial, plaintiff's counsel contacted 
defendant's counsel and the trial court and verbally requested a 
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continuance of the trial. A hearing was scheduled for April 9, 
1991, one day before trial. (R. at 164-166, 239, 252). 
5. At the hearing before the trial court on April 9, 1991, 
plaintiff's counsel represented that they had been relying on 
Dr. Steven Larsen, an endodontist who treated plaintiff, to testify 
as an expert witness and that on Friday, April 5, 1991 Dr. Larsen 
advised them he would not testify as an expert witness against Dr. 
Dickerson, or at least would not give them the opinions they 
desired. He was a treating dentist and therefore could have been 
subpoenaed to testify at trial. Based on the representations of 
plaintiff and in spite of the added expense and inconvenience to 
defendant, plaintiff's Motion for Continuance was granted and the 
trial was continued to August 26, 1991. In granting the 
continuance the trial court, Judge Newey, found that expert 
testimony was required for plaintiff to establish a prima facie 
case. Plaintiff did not dispute this. (R. at 164-166, 238-239, 
252) . 
6. At the April 9, 1991 hearing, plaintiff's counsel also 
represented they had contacted two dentists outside of Utah who 
were not identified, but who were supposedly willing to testify as 
expert witnesses although neither had reviewed the records, that 
they could make a decision concerning which one they would call and 
identify him within ten days, and would thereafter make the expert 
available for deposition. (R. at 239, 252). 
7. During the aforementioned hearing, the trial court 
ordered the parties to exchange new expert witness lists, 
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identifying their expert witnesses within ten days of the date of 
the hearing (April 9, 1991). There was no provision in the trial 
court's Order for additional time to identify new fact witnesses. 
The trial court also ordered that all discovery be completed twenty 
(20) days before trial. (R. at 164-166). 
8. Defendant served his expert witness list on April 19, 
1991, in accordance with the trial court's Order. (R. at 162-163). 
9. On April 23, 1991, counsel for both parties had a 
telephone conference regarding settlement. Plaintiff's counsel 
requested that they be allowed to defer retaining and designating 
their expert witness until settlement could be explored. 
Defendant's counsel agreed. (R. at 192). 
10. On June 28, 1991, as a culmination of the settlement 
discussions, a mediation conference was conducted at Western 
Arbitration. However, the mediation was unsuccessful. At the 
conclusion of the mediation meeting all offers had been rejected 
and no further offers of settlement were made by either party up to 
the commencement of trial. There were no settlement discussions 
during the two months between June 28, 1991 and the trial. (R. at 
213-214, 239). 
11. On August 19, 1991, five business days before trial, 
plaintiff mailed a new Witness List to defendant. (Plaintiff 
incorrectly states in her brief, at page 9, that she telefaxed this 
information to defendant) . The new Witness List named a new expert 
witness and six additional fact witnesses, never previously 
identified. (R. at 171-173). 
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witness and six additional fact witnesses, ne>ver previously 
identified. (R. at 171-173). 
12. Upon receipt of plaintiff's untimely Witness List on or 
about August 22, 1991 (two business days before trial), defendant 
filed an objection to plaintiff's designation of new witnesses and 
a Motion in Limine to preclude plaintiff from calling her newly 
named expert witness and the six newly identified fact witnesses 
at trial. (R. at 174-183). 
13. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Witness List and 
Motion in Limine were heard by the trial court on Friday, August 
23, 1991 by telephone conference hearing and again on August 26, 
1991 at the commencement of trial. (See Transcript of April 26, 
1991 hearing, attached as Addendum "A"; R. at 184, 199-219). 
14. After hearing argument from the parties and reviewing the 
memoranda submitted by the parties, the trial court found that the 
designation of new fact witnesses and the designation of an expert 
witness by plaintiff on August 19, 1991, was untimely and in 
violation of the court's Order dated April 29, 1991. (R at 199-
219) . 
15. The trial court further found that defendant would be 
seriously prejudiced if the witnesses first identified by plaintiff 
on August 19, 1991 were allowed to testify. (R. at 199-219). 
16. At the commencement of the trial, the trial court found 
that expert testimony would be required for plaintiff to establish 
a prima facie case to be submitted to a jury. Plaintiff did not 
dispute or object to this finding. Therefore, without waiving any 
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rights with respect to the trial court's ruling on the Motion in 
Limine and Motion for Continuance, plaintiff suggested and agreed 
that the trial court should dismiss the case rather than have 
plaintiff present her case without expert testimony and have the 
trial court direct a verdict against her. (R. at 199-219). 
17. The trial court's Order sustaining defendant's Objection 
to Plaintiff's witness List and granting defendant's Motion in 
Limine; denying plaintiff's oral Motion for Continuance; and 
dismissing this case with prejudice, was entered by the trial court 
on October 7, 1991. (See October 7, 1991 Order attached as 
Addendum "B"; R. at 199-202). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance and grant defendant's Motion in Limine was a proper 
exercise of discretion and should be affirmed. A trial court has 
substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances, 
and in excluding witnesses not properly designated, and will not 
be reversed on appeal unless the court has acted unreasonably and 
its' decision is arbitrary and capricious. A trial court's 
exercise of discretion will be affirmed if that discretion has 
substance in believable, admissable evidence. 
In this instance, the trial court's decision was reached after 
hearing argument from the parties and reviewing the memoranda 
submitted by the parties. The trial court considered numerous 
factors, including the impact of its decision on both parties, the 
fact that the case had been pending a long time, the fact that the 
for both parties regarding when settlement negotiations occurred 
and ended, the fact that the need for an expert witness to 
establish a prima facie case had been known to plaintiff since the 
April 9, 1991 hearing, the time available to defendant between 
plaintiff's designation of witnesses and trial to tcike depositions, 
the prejudice to each party, the interests of the Court and the 
reasonable expectations, interests and rights of the parties. (R. 
at 199-219) • 
After addressing these concerns, the trial court found that 
the designation of new fact witnesses and the designation of an 
expert witness by plaintiff on August 19, 1991 was untimely and in 
violation of the court's Order dated April 29, 1991. The trial 
court further found that defendant would be seriously prejudiced if 
the witnesses first identified by plaintiff on August 19, 1991 were 
allowed to testify. Finally, the trial court noted that the 
responsibility and burden of providing an expert witness in this 
case has been with the plaintiff from day one. (R. at 199-219). 
The trial court also found, and plaintiff did not dispute, 
that expert testimony would be required for plaintiff to establish 
a prima facie case to be submitted to a jury. Therefore, plaintiff 
suggested and agreed that the trial court should dismiss the case 
rather than have plaintiff present her case without expert 
testimony and have the trial court direct a verdict against her. 
R. at 199-219). 
There is no evidence that the trial court acted arbitrarily, 
capriciously or unreasonably. All of the relevant factual and 
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legal considerations were taken into account by the trial court 
prior to reaching its decision. Moreover, plaintiff had abundant 
time in which to prepare her case and present expert testimony. 
The evidence establishes that the trial court's exercise of 
discretion in this instance was made after carefully reviewing the 
facts and circumstances and was based on believable, admissable 
evidence. Therefore, the trial court's order denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Continuance and granting defendant's Motion in Limine 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A. Review of a Motion for Continuance and a Motion in Limine. 
The sole issue for review on appeal is whether the trial 
court's decision to deny plaintiff's Motion for Continuance and 
grant defendant's Motion in Limine was an abuse of discretion. 
The law is clear in Utah that the trial court has substantial 
discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances. Christenson 
v. Jewkes. 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). The trial judges 
action in denying a continuance will not be reversed on appeal 
unless the court has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably. 
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 926 (Utah App. 1989). The trial 
court also has broad discretion to permit or deny the testimony of 
witnesses. Christenson v. Jewkes, supra; Adroit v. Electric Mutual 
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Liability Ins. Co, . 542 P.2d 810, 815 (Ariz, 1975); In Re Estate of 
Gardner, 505 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. App. 1972). 
A trial court's exercise of discretion will be affirmed if 
that discretion has substance in believable, admissable evidence. 
Reliance National Life Insur. Co. v. Caine. 555 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 
1976). The standard for reviewing a trial court's exercise of 
discretion has previously been addressed in Peatross v. Board of 
Com'rs of Salt Lake City. 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976): 
[W]here the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of 
its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at a 
decision, the reviewing court will examine only the 
certified record; and will not interfere with matters of 
discretion or upset the actions of the lower tribunal 
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess 
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary, 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Thus, to reverse a trial court's exercise of discretion, the 
appellant must establish that the trial court acted unreasonably 
and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious. 
Other state courts have reached similar holdings regarding the 
standard of review by an appellate court when reviewing a trial 
court's exercise of discretion. The Arizona Court of Appeals 
stated it would not substitute its discretion for that of the trial 
court and that the trial court is presumed to be correct if there 
is a reasonable basis in the record to sustain the exercise of its 
discretion. Grand Real Estate. Inc. v. Sirignano, 676 P.2d 642, 
648 (Ariz. App. 1983); Lancaster v. Chemi-Cote Perlite 
Corporation. 511 P.2d 673 (Ariz. App. 1973). The Washington 
Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion: 
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Where the decision or order of the trial court is a 
matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review 
except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that 
is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on 
untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons, (citations 
omitted). 
State Ex ReL Carroll v. Junker. 482 P.2d 775, 784 (Wash. 1971). 
In this instance, there is no evidence that the trial court acted 
arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, or that its decision was 
based on untenable grounds. 
B. The Trial Court's Decision to Grant Dr. Dickerson's Motion 
in Limine and Deny Plaintiff's Second Motion for Continuance. 
The trial court carefully considered all of the relevant facts 
and circumstances before coming to its decision regarding the 
Motion in Limine and requested continuance. (R. at 199-219). 
Although plaintiff asserts that the trial court failed to 
consider the fact that there had been little formal discovery 
conducted in this case, the trial court expressly considered that 
as a factor in its decision. (R. at 207-208) . The trial court 
heard arguments from counsel for both parties and considered the 
impact of its decision on the parties. It considered the amount of 
time the case had been pending, the fact that there already had 
been one continuance, the reason for the first continuance, the 
representations of counsel for both parties regarding when 
settlement negotiations occurred and ended, the fact that the need 
for an expert witness to establish a prima facie case had been 
known to plaintiff since the April 9, 1991 hearing before the trial 
court, the time available to defendant between plaintiff's 
designation of witnesses and trial to take depositions, the 
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prejudice to each party, the interests of the court and the 
reasonable expectations, interests and rights of the parties. (R. 
at 203-219). 
After carefully considering all of these factors the court 
concluded and found: that plaintiff's designation of new fact 
witnesses and an expert witness was untimely and in violation of 
the court's order; that defendant would be seriously prejudiced if 
these witnesses were allowed to testify; that the issues presented 
in this case regarding the applicable standard of care, whether the 
standard of care was breached and causation are not within the 
common knowledge or experience of lay persons and expert testimony 
would therefore be required for plaintiff to make a prima facie 
case which could be submitted to the jury. Based on the lack of 
expert testimony to be presented by plaintiff, the matter was 
dismissed. (R. at 199-202). 
These findings are reasonable and supported by evidence before 
the court. The trial court's findings were clearly carefully 
considered and not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
In an early California court of Appeals case, Kalmus v. 
Kalmus, 230 P.2d 57 (Calif. App. 1951), the court affirmed the 
trial court's denial of a motion for continuance and discussed the 
policy considerations behind its decision: 
Because of the necessity for orderly, prompt and 
effective disposition of litigation and the loss and 
hardship to the parties to an action, as well as to 
witnesses therein, it becomes and is a part of the 
bounden duty of the trial judge, in the absence of some 
weighty reason to the contrary, to insist upon cases 
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being heard and determined with as great promptness as 
the exigencies of the case will permit. 
Id. at 63. 
Further, in the matter of In Re Estate Gardner, 505 P.2d 50 
(Colo. App. 1972), the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's refusal to allow the testimony of a witness, either as an 
expert or as a lay witness, who was not listed in the pretrial 
order nor added as a witness within the time requirements set forth 
in the pretrial order. In reaching its decision, the court relied 
on the rationale provided by the trial court: 
The court refused to allow him to testify as an expert 
and then caveators requested that he be allowed to 
testify as a lay witness. This was also refused. The 
court then stated there had been ample time to list 
witnesses and that proponent would be prejudiced and 
deprived of time to prepare for trial if the witness were 
allowed to testify. 
The purpose of such pre-trial disclosure of witnesses is 
to enable all parties to prepare for trial. (citation 
omitted) Under C.R.C.P. 16 wide discretion is vested in 
the trial court to determine whether a witness who has 
not been listed on the pre-trial order and whose name has 
not been disclosed to the opposing party may testify. 
The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
allow Dr. Murchison to testify. 
Id. at 51-52. (See also Salazar v. Ehmann. 505 P.2d 387 (Colo. 
App. 1972); wherein the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's 
decision to sustain plaintiff's objection to allowing the testimony 
of one of defendant's witnesses who had not been named as a witness 
pursuant to the pretrial order.) 
The Alaska Supreme Court reached the same decision in Bertram 
v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1967), where they upheld the trial 
court's refusal to allow the testimony of a witness who had not 
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been timely named in the pretrial memorandum. In reaching its 
decision, the court discussed the purpose behind the pretrial 
naming of witnesses: 
Pre-trial procedure is intended to assist the trial judge 
by simplifying the issues, making necessary amendments to 
the pleadings, obtaining admissions, limiting the number 
of expert witnesses and considering and making a 
determination on any other matter that will aid in the 
fair and orderly disposition of the action. . . . 
A requirement that all parties disclose the names and 
addresses of all witnesses intended to be called works to 
the advantage of both sides in completing discovery 
proceedings, eliminating surprise and shortening the 
trial. The practice is commonly followed in the Federal 
court and is to be encouraged in the courts of this 
state. 
Id. at 916. 
In this instance, plaintiff's expert witness was not 
identified to defendant until August 22, 1991 (two business days 
before trial). Defendant was severely prejudiced by this untimely 
designation. There was not reasonable time for defendant to depose 
plaintiff's expert witness. There was also no time for defendant 
to perform a background or professional investigation on 
plaintiff's expert, as is customarily done with medical experts. 
Defendant would have been faced with cross examining a 
medical/dental expert at trial with no deposition transcript to 
use, and without knowing specifically what the expert's opinions 
and bases for opinions were. Further, defendant would have had to 
cross examine six additional fact witnesses with no deposition 
transcripts and no knowledge of their trial testimony. This would 
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cross examine six additional fact witnesses with no deposition 
transcripts and no knowledge of their trial testimony. This would 
have resulted in a basic deprivation of defendant's right to 
adequately prepare a defense. 
The record in this instance clearly establishes that the trial 
court denied plaintiff's second Motion for Continuance after 
carefully evaluating the relevant facts; finding that plaintiff's 
designation of new fact witnesses and an expert witness violated 
the court's order and that defendant would be seriously prejudiced 
if these witnesses were allowed to testify. The trial court also 
noted that the responsibility and burden of providing an expert 
witness in this case has been with the plaintiff from day one. (R. 
at 199-219). 
The trial court exercised its discretion after a thorough 
consideration of the relevant factual circumstances and principles 
of law. Its decision to deny plaintiff a second continuance was 
based on believable, admissable evidence and was clearly within its 
discretion, particularly after previously granting plaintiff one 
continuance on the eve of the first trial. Moreover, plaintiff had 
abundant time in which to prepare her case and timely provide for 
expert testimony. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of 
establishing that the trial court abused its' discretion and acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously. Thus, the trial court's order 
denying plaintiff's Motion for Continuance and granting defendant's 
Motion in Limine should be affirmed. 
C Plaintiff's Arguments, 
1. The Trial Court's Decision to Deny plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance. 
Plaintiff argues in her brief that the first continuance of 
the trial was not due to her negligence or her counsel's lack of 
preparation, and because of this the first continuance should not 
have been considered by the trial court when ruling on plaintiff's 
second Motion for Continuance. (See plaintiff's Brief at 14). To 
begin with, there is no authority in support of the position that 
the trial court should not consider the first continuance as a 
factor in its decision. 
Further, it is plaintiff's responsibility to insure prior to 
trial that her witnesses will be available. This is particularly 
true when it involves an expert witness in a malprcictice case such 
as this, where the trial court had previously ruled that expert 
testimony was required to establish a prima facie case. 
Finally, the trial court considered a number of factors in 
reaching its decision to deny plaintiff's second Motion for 
Continuance, not just the fact that there already had been one 
continuance. (R- at 207, 217-218). 
Among those other factors considered by the trial court, which 
are already referred to above, are the following: plaintiff's 
violation of the court's order and the extreme prejudice to the 
defendant; the impact of its decision on the parties; the amount of 
time the case had been pending; the representations of counsel for 
both parties regarding when settlement negotiations occurred and 
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ended; the fact that the need for an expert witness to establish a 
prima facie case had been known to plaintiff since the April 9, 
1991 hearing before the trial court; the time available to 
defendant between plaintiff's designation of witnesses and trial to 
take depositions; the prejudice to each party; the interests of the 
Court and the reasonable expectations, interests and rights of the 
parties. (R. at 199-219). 
2. Plaintiff's Untimely Named Expert Witness. 
Plaintiff also argues that there was an agreement between the 
parties that she would not need to designate her experts until 
settlement negotiations had failed, and that the trial court 
ignored this. (See plaintiff's Brief at 15). This is incorrect, 
as the trial court specifically addressed this issue, hearing from 
both parties when the second Motion for Continuance was argued. 
(R. at 207-219). Plaintiff further asserts that defendant made no 
reference to this agreement in the proceedings below. This is also 
incorrect, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings below. 
(R. at 211-214). Defendant specifically addressed and disagreed 
with plaintiff's assertions that settlement negotiations had been 
ongoing and she would not have to name her expert witness. (R. at 
211-214). 
Defendant did agree, on April 23, 1991, to allow plaintiff's 
counsel to defer retaining and designating their expert witness 
until settlement of the case could be explored. (R. at 192) . 
However, as a culmination of the settlement discussions, a 
mediation conference was conducted at Western Arbitration on June 
28, 1991. The mediation was unsuccessful. At the conclusion of 
the mediation meeting all offers had been rejected and no further 
offers of settlement were made by either party up to the 
commencement of trial. There were no settlement discussions 
between June 28, 1991 and the trial. (R. at 213-214, 239). 
Both parties knew this case was going to trial. It is not 
Defendant's responsibility to insure that plaintiff comply with the 
court's order by timely naming her witnesses. Although Dr. 
Dickerson was accommodating to plaintiff regarding her designation 
of an expert, he certainly could not be expected to wait until only 
a few days before trial for plaintiff to designate her expert. 
Particularly since the trial court had ordered that all discovery 
be completed twenty (20) days before trial, which was well after 
the unsuccessful mediation meeting and last settlement discussion. 
(R. at 164-166). 
Despite the fact that formal discovery had been limited, 
plaintiff knew throughout the case that Defendant wanted to depose 
her expert witness. (R. at 212) . This was clearly known at the 
time of the first continuance, when the trial Judge set a deadline 
to designate expert witnesses in ten days and set a discovery 
cutoff of twenty days before trial. (R. at 212). 
Plaintiff also asserts in her brief that she made her untimely 
named expert witness available for deposition prior to trial and 
that counsel for Dr. Dickerson chose not to take the deposition. 
(See plaintiff's Brief at 8-9). This assertion is only partially 
accurate, as plaintiff made her expert available for a telephone 
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deposition only. (R. at Exhibit "B" of supplemental record). 
Moreover, the offer to depose plaintiff's expert by telephone was 
not received until August 22, 1991 (two business days before 
trial). Finally, the offer indicated that plaintiff's expert would 
be available later in the week, which only could have meant one to 
two business days before trial (Thursday or Friday). 
3. Plaintiff's Need for Expert Testimony. 
Plaintiff's next argument is that the trial court should be 
reversed because it failed to recognize an exception to the general 
rule that expert testimony is required to establish a prima facie 
case in an action for dental malpractice, citing Nixdorf v. Hicken, 
612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) . (See plaintiff's Brief at 16) . However, 
the trial court (Judge Newey and Judge West) informally advised 
plaintiff that expert testimony appeared necessary in this case, 
but the issue was never disputed by plaintiff. (R. at 207, 209-
210, 217). Moreover, on each occasion when plaintiff requested a 
continuance of the trial, she argued it was necessary because she 
couldn't present a case without an expert witness. 
Plaintiff's argument that the exception noted in Nixdorf 
should apply in this instance is directly contradictory to her 
other argument, that the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying her Motion for Continuance. The only reason for each of 
plaintiff's Motions for Continuance was so she could present an 
expert witness to testify at trial. If she did not need an expert 
to establish her case, as she argues in her brief, then she would 
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not have needed the first continuance or have asked the trial court 
for a second continuance. 
Further, plaintiff has presented no evidence that the 
exception to the need for expert testimony is applicable in this 
instance. She asserts in paragraph 22 of her complaint that Dr. 
Dickerson was negligent in the following ways: filled cavities in 
her teeth with low grade composite fillings, known to cause 
leakage, and to encourage decay in teeth; failure to treat problems 
in her teeth properly; his prescription of Penicillin VK to her 
regularly over the course of a two-year period; and his failure to 
refer her to a specialist. (R. at 5). These allegations do not 
create the type of situation envisioned by the Court in Nixdorf. 
which held the following: 
Specifically, expert testimony is unnecessary to 
establish the standard of care owed the plaintiff where 
the propriety of the treatment received is within the 
common knowledge and experience of the laymen. The loss 
of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the 
operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment. We 
explained in Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 388, 227 
P.2d 772, 773 (1951): 
Whether a surgical operation was unskillfully 
or skillfully performed is a scientific 
question. If, however, a surgeon should lose 
the instrument with which he operates in the 
incision . . ., it would seem as a matter of 
common sense that scientific opinion could 
throw little light on the subject. 
Id. at 352. 
The facts in this case, and the allegations of negligence referred 
to above in plaintiff's complaint, clearly do not present the type 
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of scenario contemplated by the Court in Nixdorf where expert 
testimony would be unnecessary. 
Finally, as noted above, two different judges from the trial 
court specifically stated that the need for plaintiff to present 
expert testimony to establish a prima facie case was obvious from 
the beginning. (R. at 207, 209-210, 217) . At no time did plaintiff 
dispute this by arguing that she could proceed without ari expert or 
except to the court's finding. 
4. Record of the Trial Court Proceedings. 
Finally, plaintiff asserts that the lack of a complete record, 
the transcript or tape of the August 23, 1991 telephone hearing, 
also supports reversal of the trial court's order. (See 
plaintiff's brief at 19). However, plaintiff fails to state what 
evidence is missing from this hearing that would support her 
position. Moreover, this Court has previously held that when 
crucial matters are not in the record, the missing portions are 
presumed to support the trial judge. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 
938, 943 (Utah 1987). 
II 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND ISSUE PRESENTED IN HER 
BRIEF, THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY DISMISSING THIS ACTION WITH 
PREJUDICE, IS SUBSTANTIVELY THE SAME AS HER 
FIRST ISSUE. 
Plaintiff asserts in her brief that there is a second issue to 
be considered on appeal; namely, whether the trial court's 
dismissal of her action with prejudice, based upon a "procedural 
defect" (lack of expert testimony), was reversible error. (See 
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plaintiff's Brief at 2, 19-20). However, this is in substance the 
same issue as the first issue. If the denial of plaintiff's Motion 
to Continue was not an abuse of discretion, the dismissal was 
clearly appropriate. 
As stated above, at the commencement of the trial on August 
26, 1991 the trial court found that expert testimony would be 
required for plaintiff to establish a prima facie case to be 
submitted to a jury. (R. at 199-202). Plaintiff never disputed 
that expert testimony was necessary. In fact, if expert testimony 
was not necessary, plaintiff would not have needed a continuance. 
Rather, plaintiff suggested and agreed that the trial court should 
dismiss the case rather than have plaintiff present her case 
without expert testimony and have the court direct a verdict 
against her. These events are recorded in the trial court's order 
of October 7, 1991. (R. at 199-202). Thus, plaintiff was given an 
opportunity to proceed with her case and chose not to because she 
acknowledged it would have been futile. 
Additionally, the law is clear in Utah that to make a prima 
facie case in a medical/dental malpractice case, the plaintiff must 
present competent evidence: (1) establishing the standard of care 
ordinarily exercised by other practitioners in the defendant's 
field of practice, (2) that the defendant departed from the 
applicable standard of care and (3) that such departure proximately 
caused the injury. Butterfield v. Okubo, 750 P.2d 94, 96-97 (Utah 
App. 1990); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 
1988); Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980). These 
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three elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case must be 
established by competent expert testimony. Reeves v. Geigy 
Pharmaceutical, Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah App. 1988); 
Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270# 271 (Utah 
App, 1987). Without such testimony, a plaintiff cannot proceed and 
the case must be dismissed. 
If the thrust of plaintiff's argument is that the dismissal 
should not have been with prejudice, the argument is without merit 
and raises only the same issue previously discussed herein. A 
dismissal without prejudice would be the equivalent of a 
continuance, but freeing plaintiff from all prior pre-trial orders. 
Obviously, a dismissal without prejudice would have been senseless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, and because 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, Dr. Dickerson 
requests that the trial court's Order be affirmed. 
DATED this day of April, 1992. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
G. Williams 
Terence L. Rooney 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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IN THE FIRST'JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GINA M. HILL, 
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vs . Civil No. 900000135 
DR. CARL DICKERSON, 
Defendant 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 26th day of August, 
1991, the above-referenced matter came on for trial in 
the Box Elder County Courthouse, 01 South Main, 
Brigham City, Utah, commencing at the hour of 11:00 
o'clock a.m., the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. 
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For the Defendant: 
DOUGLAS M. DURBANO 
Attorney at Law 
Harrison Professional Plaza 
3340 Harrison Blvd. 
Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Attorneys at Law 
1100 Newhouse Building 
#10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
01 South Main 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
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71991 
THE CLERK: Case number 900000135. Gina M. Hill 
vs. Dr. Carl Dickerson. Counsel, please state your 
appearances for the record. 
MR. DURBANO: Douglas M. Durbano, appearing for 
the plaintiff. 
MR. WILLIAMS: David J. Williams of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau for Dr. Dickerson, the 
defendant. 
THE COURT: This is the time set for trial. I'd 
first like to address the ladies and gentlemen called 
here for jury service. I appreciate you being here. 
I know it was somewhat of a short notice to make your 
appearance here this morning to help us in resolving 
this particular case. I appreciate you taking your 
time to do tha t . 
It will not be necessary for us to keep 
you any later here this morning. I've been called 
upon to make a decision on a legal matter and I have 
ruled on that and we're going to put that on the 
record here this morning. The net effect of my ruling 
will be to take this case away from the necessity of 
being tried today and move it along on the channels of 
justice as it goes forward. 
I understand, Mr. Bailiff, they have all 
been paid and taken care of. 
•-'I'I 
1 MR. BAILIFF: No, sir. They'll get the pay as 
2 they go out. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Clerk, I don't know, is there 
4 a possibility they'll be called again? 
5 THE CLERK: Because they've made an appearance 
6 they will be excused and are finished for this term. 
7 THE COURT: This will complete your jury service, 
8 even though you didn't actually get to sit as a jury. 
9 Your being here means you won't be called again on the 
10 next rotation. You are all excused with my heartfelt 
11 thanks and I appreciate you being here this morning. 
12 I hope we didn't break up your day too badly. Thank 
1 3 you. 
14 (All prospective jurors out of the courtroom.) 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Durbano, Mr. Williams, that 
16 brings us to the matter now that we need to make a 
17 record about. Since last Friday, when we had a 
18 conference call, we've been discussing the issue of 
19 whether or not plaintiff in this particular case 
20 timely complied with Judge Gunnell's, or Judge Newey's 
21 order, in regards to disclosure of expert witnesses 
22 and witnesses in preparation for this trial. 
23 According to the order that was signed by 
24 the judge, all discovery and notification of witnesses 
25 J in this case was supposed to have been complied with 
1 clear back in April. I believe it was within ten days 
2 after. Let me look at it. 
3 Yes. I show that on the 8th day of 
4 January 1991, Judge Gunnell made an order indicating 
5 that plaintiff needed to supply her expert witness 
6 list to the defendant by February 8th, 1991, and the 
7 defendant was to provide his expert witness list by 
8 March 8th, 1991. 
9 My understanding is that on August 19th, 
10 four days -- actually, a week prior to the trial date, 
11 but four days prior to when we had our hearing, the 
12 defendant was notified in fact that the plaintiff had 
13 selected an expert and was going to ask that that 
14 expert be allowed to testify here in the trial. 
15 MR. DURBANO: Could I clarify one point for the 
16 record? 
17 THE COURT: Yes. 
18 MR. DURBANO: The actual order that I think the 
19 judge wants -- the court wants to refer to is the one 
20 that was granted in August. The order in January was 
21 complied with. We identified one of the treating 
22 physicians as the expert witness and it was the day 
23 before trial that that treating physician became 
24 reluctant and indicated his unwillingness to testify 
25 I and so we asked for a continuance and the court 
granted us ten days to appoint a second expert 
wi tnes s. 
3 | THE COURT: That was in April? 
4 I MR. DURBANO: Yes, April. I'm sorry, I said 
5 I A u g u s t . 
6 | THE COURT: All right. Mr. Durbano submitted his 
7 I list on behalf of the plaintiff, the expert witnesses, 
8 | and Mr. Williams, on behalf of the defense, filed an 
9 I objection. Mr. Durbano filed a response to the 
10 I objection and you argued that to me on Friday. 
11 I gave you my feeling Friday, in the 
12 telephone conference call that we had, that, one, I 
13 was of the opinion that the plaintiff was in need of 
14 an expert in order to establish the standard of care 
15 in a case of this nature; two, to me it was clear and 
16 obvious from the beginning that an expert would be 
17 necessary in this particular case; three, I felt that 
18 there was extreme prejudice by the late notice or 
19 indication of an expert. It was also clear to me that 
20 in their discussions and in their conversations both 
21 counsel indicated that once the plaintiff identified 
22 their expert that the defendant did want to engage in 
23 formal discovery. 
24 Mr. Durbano, in fairness to your side of 
25 I the case, I am also aware that all through this case 
1 there has been little or no depositions and that 
2 discovery has been of an informal nature. 
3 I'll now give each counsel an opportunity 
4 to address the issue and make any record that you 
5 would like to make on this case, starting first with 
6 Mr. Durbano. 
7 MR. DURBANO: Thank you, Your Honor. I 
8 appreciate the opportunity because, as the court has 
9 noted, without the ability to call an expert witness 
10 for today's trial, the court has indicated in 
11 chambers, at least, that it would be inclined to grant 
12 a directed verdict at the end of plaintiff's case, 
13 essentially eliminating the need for a trial. That# 
14 therefore, is the basis of our decision to allow the 
15 court to dismiss the jury and not go forward with the 
16 te s timony. 
17 I would point out to the court that in our 
18 last conversation, and I believe it was on the record, 
19 is that correct, last Friday's conversation? 
20 THE COURT: That was taped. 
21 MR. DURBANO: On the record the court encouraged 
22 the defendant to take the telephone deposition of Dr. 
23 Hiller to avoid any potential surprise. I would 
24 indicate that the defense counsel chose not to and 
25 | thus came to court today knowing that he was not going 
1 to take the deposition of Dr. Hiller, notwithstanding 
2 that he did have the opportunity and we did make Dr. 
3 Hiller available. 
4 I would point out that on April 24thf 
5 1991/ there was an exchange of correspondence between 
6 our office and Mr. Williams's office where we 
7 confirmed that the hiring by both parties of an expert 
8 witness would be waived at that time, based upon the 
9 parties having finally initiated settlement 
10 negotiations and were entering into an arbitration or 
11 mediation effort, so that no expert witnesses would be 
12 required until complete failure of our negotiation 
13 efforts, as the letter states. At this date I still 
14 do not know when complete failure of the negotiations 
15 occurred. We were negotiating up to and including 
16 today . 
17 I think that the defendant in this case 
18 has always known, based upon Judge Newey's previous 
19 ruling, that the plaintiff intended to call either an 
20 expert from Colorado, which was the original expert 
21 designated at the hearing, who would possibly be 
22 available for trial, or in the alternative that Dr. 
23 Hiller would be called from Idaho if the expert from 
24 Colorado was unavailable. As trial got closer it 
25 ! became evident that Dr. Hiller's schedule would 
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accommodate better the trial setting and Dr. Hiller 
was selected and we notified defense counsel of that 
selection. 
I don't believe it came as a surprise. I 
believe that defense counsel and the defendant has 
known all along that we would anticipate calling an 
expert, based upon the previous ruling of the court 
that an expert would be required. 
Therefore, while I recognize the court has 
indicated that it might be prejudicial to the 
defendant because they have not had an opportunity to 
depose the expert, I believe that the prejudice must 
be borne by the defendant and that if they have not 
done so it's because of their own waiver or failure to 
do so. 
To perfectly clear up the record, not only 
has there not been any depositions in this case, there 
have never been any formal interrogatories, requests 
for admissions or requests for production of 
documents. The entire case has been handled 
informally, until the eleventh hour when the defendant 
now insists upon a formal deposition of the 
23 | plaintiff's expert. 
24 | Last but not least, while it may be 
25 j prejudicial, and I underline the word may, for the 
1 defendant not to have deposed Dr. Hiller, for us to be 
2 precluded from having an expert is more than 
3 prejudicial it defeats our entire case. 
4 With that, I would again urge the court to 
5 grant either a motion for continuance, which I would 
6 make right now, and allow this case to be heard at a 
7 later date when the defendant has had an opportunity 
8 to depose Dr. Hiller, or in the alternative ask the 
9 court to reconsider its in chambers motion and order 
10 that the plaintiff be allowed to put on her testimony 
11 including the expert witness Dr. Hiller. 
12 Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Williams. 
14 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. Our motion 
15 was filed the very day that I received the designation 
16 of expert witness and, I might note, six additional 
17 fact witnesses who had never been identified in any 
18 form prior to the witness list dated August 19th. We 
19 acted within one day, and that was two business days 
20 before trial that I received the names of an expert 
21 witness and six additional fact witnesses. 
22 Addressing counsel's points about 
23 discovery, when this case was in the early stages 
24 plaintiff indicated she were not going to call an 
25 I expert witness in this case. We indicated to them 
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that if they didn't we wouldn't and we would both rely 
on the treating dentist- That's why no formal 
discovery was done. We both were able to talk with 
the treating dentist. We had meetings with each other 
to hear what the parties were going to say. 
But once the plaintiff indicated she would 
call an expert witness it was made known clearly that 
we would require a formal deposition of that expert 
witness. Counsel has not denied that, I don't 
believe. No one disputes that. That's when we were 
here in court before Judge Newey, when the plaintiff 
sought the first continuance in this case just one day 
before trial, I think. We'd prepared and were ready 
to go to trial and the plaintiff came in and wanted a 
continuance. Judge Newey gave them that break at that 
time, because he recognized that they might have a 
problem putting on a case without an expert witness. 
In fact; he so ruled and I think they agreed and said 
they needed a continuance and it was granted. 
At that time it was clearly made known 
that formal depositions would be required. The judge 
recognized that and set a deadline ten days from then 
to designate the expert witnesses and set a discovery 
cut off 20 days before trial, all discovery to be 
25 j completed by that time 
1 We then designated our expert witness. We 
2 filed, in accordance with the court's order, a 
3 designation naming our expert witness. The plaintiff 
4 didn•t. 
5 They then contacted me and said we would 
6 like to try and settle this case without incurring 
7 additional expenses and I told them that's okay, we 
8 can try to settle the case. We've gone through great 
9 efforts to try and resolve the matter with them. At 
10 no time have there been any discussions about that 
11 since the mediation meeting in Salt Lake several weeks 
12 ago. There haven't been any ongoing discussions since 
13 that time. I want the record to be clear that there 
14 have not been continuing settlement negotiations up to 
15 today, as was suggested by counsel. That's not the 
16 case. When we left the attempted mediation in Salt 
17 Lake everything broke off and that was it. Until the 
18 court's ruling today there was never another offer 
19 made by the plaintiff or another request by them to us 
20 for an offer, or another offer made by us. Excuse me, 
21 until the hearing with the court on Friday that never 
22 occurred. 
23 So to suggest that there has somehow been 
24 continuing settlement negotiations that justified not 
25 complying with the court's order is wrong. There were 
1 not after that. Even if there had been, certainly 
2 nobody can claim it's reasonable to wait until three 
3 or four business days before trial to designate an 
4 expert that they know the other side wants to depose. 
5 Our position, obviously, is that it would 
6 be highly prejudicial to Dr. Dickerson to have to 
7 proceed without knowing what an expert witness on 
8 standard of care and causation is going to say. 
9 Additionally, there were six fact witnesses named and 
10 we don't have any idea what they were supposed to say. 
11 We had a right to take their depositions, but 
12 obviously they had to be named early enough for us to 
13 do that . 
14 With respect to the motion for a 
15 continuance, this case has been continued at their 
16 request once before already for the same reason. Dr. 
17 Dickerson has had this case hanging over his head for 
18 a long time now. The claim was first made in 1988. 
19 It involves treatment back in 1986. He's had a 
20 lawsuit hanging over his head, or a claim hanging over 
21 his head, for three years now. I don't know that any 
22 of us really appreciate what that does to a dentist or 
23 doctor, to have that hanging over his head, but it's 
24 J been extremely disruptive to him and he has a right to 
25 | have the thing end and another continuance at this 
1 point would be highly prejudicial to him. We 
2 therefore resist the motion for continuance. 
3 Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Durbano, any response? 
5 MR. DURBANO: Finally, Your Honor, I still have 
6 never heard defense counsel or anyone from the 
7 defendant's side designate what date settlement offers 
8 ended or settlement discussions ended and we as 
9 plaintiff were alerted that settlement is over, 
10 designate your expert, let's get ready for trial. 
11 It's just always been a nebulous, well, sometime. I 
12 think, for the record, defense counsel should be 
13 required to state what date that occurred. 
14 Secondly, any prejudice that may come to 
15 Dr. Dickerson because of an expert being designated, 
16 the specific name of an expert at least being 
17 designated three or four days before trial, could 
18 easily be cured by a very short continuance, while in 
19 the alternative, without a continuance my clients are 
20 not only prejudiced, but are out their day in court. 
21 My clients have suffered, Your Honor, and for the 
22 record, while it's true Dr. Dickerson has been faced 
23 with litigation, my clients have been faced with an 
24 I injury that's now permanent. 
25 | That's all. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'm not unmindful of the 
impact and the effect that this has had on both the 
plaintiff and on the defendant, but I must give a 
couple of comments from the court's position. 
First of all, this case has been pending a 
long time and I know that that creates wear and tear 
on both parties. More importantly, the court orders 
in regards to discovery cut off dates and designation 
of witnesses was very clear. Both counsel chose to 
engage in informal discussions and settlement and 
chose to deviate from the court's record. 
Mr. Durbano, you made a comment that at no 
point did the defense tell you when the settlement was 
cut off and therefore, to a certain extent, you feel 
that you should have additional time. But no one 
bothered to include the court in this, no one has 
bothered to notify the court and indicate that you 
were going to deviate from the order that was 
existing. The order is specific. It is crystal clear 
as to when cut off is to occur and when the witnesses 
are to be designated. There's no notice to the court 
or indication that you two have decided to do 
otherwise and continue your negotiations or continue 
on with the case. 
Tn regards to the necessity of an expert, 
1 I this court is of the opinion, from simply reading the 
2 I case from day one, that it would be necessary in a 
3 | malpractice or negligence nature of this suite, 
4 I involving a professional, whether it be a dentist, 
5 | lawyer, engineer, that the plaintiff needed an expert 
6 | to set out the standard of care or the burden from 
which there must be some deviation in order to show 
8 | negligence . 
9 I There was also a ruling on this, when both 
10 counsel thought this was going to go to trial without 
11 an expert and you would be able to use the attending 
12 dentist, the judge ruled early on in the game that he 
13 was of the opinion that it would be necessary to have 
14 an expert in order for the plaintiff to prevail. 
15 My feeling is, waiting as long as we did, 
16 bringing all the people that we brought here for the 
17 trial, bringing in a judge, everything else, the court 
18 is of the opinion that it's going to enforce the 
19 discovery cut off deadlines that were in place. That 
20 results, I guess, in having the matter dismissed. 
21 I'm denying your request for a 
22 continuance, Mr. Durbano. I don't know how many more 
23 times we can continue it. You can argue we've only 
24 I had one continuance, we only need one more short one, 
25 I but to me it's very clear that the responsibility and 
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burden of providing an expert witness in this case has 
been with the plaintiff from day one on this case. 
And even when plaintiff took the position that perhaps 
she could bet get by without one, the judge ruled that 
you would need an expert. 
Mr. Williams, if you'll prepare the order, 
since your side prevailed in this, I'll sign it. That 
will be all, counsel. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Please submit it to Mr. Durbano for 
approval as to form before you submit it to me. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I'll do that. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
(Concluded at 11:15 a.m.) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the proceedings in the 
captioned matter were taken before me, Rodney M. 
Felshaw, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary 
Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at 
Brigham City, Utah. 
That said proceedings were reported by me in 
stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be trans-
cribed into typewriting; and that a full, true and 
correct transcription is set forth in the foregoing 
pages numbered from 2 to 16, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript 
was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, 
Brigham City, Utah. 
I further certify that I am not associated with 
any of the parties to said matter and that I am not 
interested in the event thereof. 
Witness my hand and official seal at Brigham 
City, Utah, this 30th day of August, 1991. 
Rodney M.^Felshaf 
K 
\ 
My Commission Expires: 
January 4, 1992 
D a r* a 1 ^ 
TabB 
BRIGHAM DISTRICT 
SEP 17 I w Hi f9J 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS - A3481 
TERENCE L. ROONEY - A5789 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GINA M. HILL, 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. 900000135 PI 
DR. CARL DICKERSON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for trial on August 26, 1991 at 10:00 a.m. 
before the Court, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's witness List and Motion in 
Limine dated August 22, 1991 was heard by the Court on August 23, 
1991 by telephone conference hearing and again on August 26, 1991 
at the commencement of trial. The Court, after hearing argument 
from the parties and reviewing the memoranda submitted by the 
parties, finds that the designation of new fact witnesses and the 
designation of an expert witness by plaintiff on August 19, 1991, 
was untimely and in violation of this Court's Order dated April 29, 
1991. The Court further finds that defendant would be seriously 
25#t£/55-3Z 
M I C R O F I L M E D 
prejudiced if the witnesses first identified by plaintiff on August 
19, 1991 were allowed to testify. 
At the commencement of trial, plaintiff advised the Court that 
in view of the Court's ruling granting defendant's Motion in 
Limine, plaintiff would not have an expert witness at trial and 
could not offer any expert testimony. The Court found that the 
issues presented in this case regarding the applicable standard of 
care, whether the standard of care was breached and causation are 
not within the common knowledge or experience of lay persons and 
expert testimony would therefore be required for plaintiff to make 
a prima facie case which could be submitted to the jury. 
Therefore, without waiving any rights with respect to the Court's 
rulings, plaintiff suggested and agreed that the Court should 
dismiss the case rather than have plaintiff present her case 
without expert testimony and then direct a verdict against her. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Witness List is 
sustained and his Motion in Limine dated August 22, 1991 is 
granted. 
2. Plaintiff's oral motion for continuance made on August 
26, 1991 at the commencement of trial is denied. 
3. This matter is dismissed with prejudice based on the lack 
of any expert testimony establishing the applicable standard of 
care, any breach of the applicable standard of care or, injury 
caused by a breach of the applicable standard of care. 
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4. Defendant is awarded costs. 
DATED this n day of Q&w&t- , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
W. Brent West 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
•3-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATRICIA c. WHITE, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
Defendant herein; that she served the attached ORDER (Case Number 
900000135 PI, First Judicial District Court of Box Elder County) 
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Douglas M. Durbano 
Paul H. Johnson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3340 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on 
the day of August, 1991. 
UJ. 
Patricia c. white 
yc. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this <3? day of August, 
1991 
My Commission Expires: 
ralr-lQZ 
A ;/^Q-'^-ru^v6-
. - " & 
NQTIARY PUBLIC 
Residing in tn"e State of .Utah •1 
- 4 -
